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Commentary
LEGAL RESPONSES TO MASS
PROTEST ACTIONS: THE DRAMATIC
ROLE OF SOLIDARITY IN
OBTAINING GENEROUS PLEA
BARGAINS©
BY FRANCES OLSEN*
My commentary deals with mass protest actions challenging some
of the abusive practices associated with globalization. An important
purpose of these protests has been to question the legitimacy of globalizing
agencies and to hold them accountable. From a U.S. perspective, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle in November of 1999 was a
crucial turning point. Before the meeting, or the lead-up to the meeting,
most people in the United States barely knew what the WTO was and even
fewer had any idea that the WTO was doing anything that might harm them
in any way.
This innocence was suddenly lost for many individuals when they
saw television news footage of what some called a riot in the streets of
Seattle. Knowledge of the wTo had come to others more gradually during
the lead-up to the meeting when various news reporters interviewed,
sometimes sympathetically, spokespeople for some of the organizations
planning to hold anti-wTo demonstrations. Those following the news
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during October and November of 1999 would know that a broad coalition
of labour unions, young people, and other generally leftist organizations
appeared to be developing, raising questions about the undemocratic
nature of the w'ro. Much of the news footage, however, focused on the
advance preparations the Seattle police were making, which they said was
"to ensure that there would be no violence."
When the demonstrations began in late November, the first thing
many noticed was a short delay in the beginning of the meeting.
Participants in the WTO meeting were quite aware that it was unable to
begin on time because of demonstrators blocking the streets and doors.
Demonstrators charged that the police response was violent and excessive.
Nonetheless, by the time of the evening news, much of the reporting fixated
on a small group, dressed in black, who the media referred to as anarchists
or provos. This was the group responsible for the notorious garbage can
thrown through the window of Starbucks-some would add "or was it
McDonald's?" While this property damage did not occur until some time
after much of the police violence had already been inflicted upon
demonstrators who had been sitting peacefully in the street, such fine
points were lost on most of the media. During the next two days, the
footage of the garbage can thrown through the window was shown
repeatedly; interviews were occasionally aired in which the people of
Seattle expressed outrage at the unprovoked violence engaged in by the
police.
Any effort to analyze the overall effectiveness of the demonstration
would require a complex assessment of several factors: the increased public
scrutiny of the actions of the WTO; the possibility that the demonstration
helped to empower the smaller countries to stand up to various kinds of
bullying and exclusion from decision-making meetings that some claim had
become normal behavior by the larger countries; the communication and
alliance building among people within the United States and people from
other countries; and the momentum for further street activism that any
such action can create. My goal is the much more modest: I shall examine
the use of solidarity tactics by the demonstrators during and after their
arrests.
One of the many areas in which the law on the books differs from
the law in practice is in the police response to demonstrations. In the law
on the books, the United States respects freedom of speech and allows
people to demonstrate against government policy and to protest actions
taken by the United States government or its agencies. In theory, when
foreign business people or dignitaries choose to meet in the United States,
one of the things they must take into account is that demonstrators may
disrupt the atmosphere the group would prefer to enjoy during the
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meeting. In actual practice, however, a claimed concern with the physical
safety of the meeting's participants or even a concern with general decorum
or the participants' psychic welfare serves to limit freedom of speech. Police
and other government officials attempt to control protest activities by
limiting parade permits and by instigating confrontations with
demonstrators.
In this commentary, I examine some of the more successful
responses to these police strategies. My primary focus will be on three mass
protests: the wTo meeting in Seattle, Washington in November, 1999; the
World Bank meeting in Washington, D.C. in April, 2000; and the
Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, California in 2000. In all
three situations, the police appeared to use publicity surrounding their
advance preparations for anticipated disruptions to discourage more
moderate would-be protestors. Evidence of the success of this tactic is
difficult to assess. There is considerable anecdotal evidence that
demonstrators were discouraged, and such a response is intuitively
understandable. There is also some evidence that the police preparations
may have increased the general publicity surrounding the demonstrations,
contributing to the particular publicity efforts of the groups sponsoring the
demonstrations. Thus, two factors served to counterbalance the
intimidation effect: first, increased knowledge of the expected
demonstrations, and second, specific resistance to, or defiance of, efforts
to minimize the demonstrations.
Each of these three demonstrations was preceded by an
extraordinary number of training sessions at which potential demonstrators
and their volunteer lawyers discussed non-violence, anticipated a variety of
police responses to the demonstrators, and role-played actions during and
after the demonstrations. This role-playing included devising ways to defuse
hostile situations, to gently control police agents provocateurs posing as
demonstrators or demonstrators who strayed from agreed upon non-violent
scenarios, and to protect as best one could against the effects of chemical
and conventional police weapons. In addition, demonstrators role-played
arrests, bookings, arraignments, and plea bargaining.
Although a number of participants in each of these three
demonstrations planned and intended to engage in non-violent civil
disobedience-usually blocking doors or streets-most of the people
arrested were attempting merely to engage in a lawful demonstration. Press
reports sometimes described the arrests as caused by being at the wrong
place at the wrong time. In each of the three demonstrations considered
here, there were also a considerable number of people arrested who never
intended to be arrested and, in some cases, who in fact had nothing to do
with the demonstrations.
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In Seattle especially, the police arrested large numbers of people
who either did not participate at all or who joined in the demonstrations in
response to what they considered to be abusive behaviour by the police.
Approximately six hundred people were arrested during two days of
demonstrations. A significant number of individuals, including both those
who had participated in pre-demonstration training and those who had not,
refused to give their names to police upon arrest. By refusing to give their
names, the demonstrators reduced the authorities' ability to release the
arrestees one by one. Despite the demonstrators filling the jails and
supporters surrounding the jails, no acceptable plea bargains were offered
for four to five days. A large proportion of the detainees had not expected
to be arrested and were not prepared to spend an extended period of time
in jail. To avoid an inevitable dwindling away of their numbers as people
had to return to family or work obligations, the defendants determined to
give their names, accept release from jail, and move their struggle to the
courts. They pleaded not guilty, refused to waive their right to a speedy trial
or to a jury trial, and requested court-appointed counsel. Some forty-two
people, or 7 per cent of those arrested, accepted conventional plea bargains
individually, one by one. The other 93 per cent resisted pressure to plead
out and as the speedy trial time began to expire, the prosecutors dropped
another 92 per cent of the cases.
During the last few weeks before the cases would have been
dismissed for the denial of a speedy trial, the prosecutors chose six cases to
bring to trial. Five of the six defendants brought to trial won acquittals or
dismissals and the single conviction resulted in a small fine and community
service.
In Washington, D.C., more than twice as many people were
arrested over a period of three days. Of some 1,300 people arrested, about
150 refused to give their names or addresses and remained in jail. The D.C.
jails were under a standing court order to prevent overcrowding with a
provision that imposed financial penalties on the warden whenever the limit
was exceeded. This allowed the 150 demonstrators to put considerable
pressure on the system.
The Chief Judge responded to this numbers crisis by ordering the
court-appointed attorneys for the demonstrators to file motions for the
release of their clients. The defense lawyers filed their motions. The
demonstrators refused to go to court for the hearings. In some cases, the
detainees stripped naked and tied themselves to the bunks in their cells.
The few who were nevertheless taken to court had the knowledge and
confidence to speak up to the judge, demanding the dismissal of their
court-appointed counsel and withdrawl of the motions for release. At this
point, the judge ordered the prosecutors to negotiate with the defense
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lawyers chosen by the demonstrators.
The agreement negotiated was a reduction of all charges from
misdemeanours to civil infractions with an agreed penalty of a $5 fine.
Moreover, the agreement provided that those activists who had already
pleaded or forfeited bail could also withdraw their pleas and take
advantage of the negotiated plea bargain.
In Los Angeles, the demonstrations were preceded by an
extraordinary amount of litigation in response to repeated efforts by the
police and the city to limit the area and scope of demonstrations. Shortly
before the Democratic Convention and at the same convention site, the
police did nothing to prevent a riot by sports fans celebrating the victory
of their basketball team. The rioters burned police cars, destroyed
commercial property, and attacked passersby. Predictably, the police were
criticized for doing too little. Some in the city realized that the police
intended to react very differently to the case of demonstrations at the
Convention and would delight in claiming that their overreaction to the
demonstrations was somehow related to or in response to the criticism of
their failure to respond to the sports riot.
During the Democratic National Convention, the downtown area
of the city was flooded with more police than citizens realized existed in the
entire state of California. University dormitories were rented to house out-
of-town law enforcement officers. Many of the police were in full riot gear.
Under the circumstances it was surprising that no more than some 170
people were arrested during the three days of demonstrations. Since the
Los Angeles jails have a capacity of around ten thousand and do not
experience an overcrowding problem, standard jail solidarity would barely
have been noticed by the system.
Of the 170 arrested, about 50 refused to give their names or
addresses and remained in jail. Knowing they could not otherwise exert
pressure, the group had decided in advance to fast in jail. They obtained
medical advice and appointed "designated eaters" to remain healthy and
monitor the physical and emotional well-being of their colleagues. At the
arraignment, each activist announced the fast by the following statement:
Your Honor, I am in solidarity with all other activists arrested here. We want to negotiate
collectively with the prosecutor, to work out a universal plea bargain. Until then, we will not
give our names or addresses, nor will we promise to return to court if we are released. At
this time, I plead not guilty while reserving the right to demur; I do not waive time; and I
request court-appointed counsel.
The fast inside the jail was supported by a sympathy fast by
supporters holding a vigil outside the jail that received much media
attention. Those outside the jail included some dozen people and fifty life-
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size puppets named J. Doe, representing each of the fasters in jail. The
fasters' demand was that the sheriff persuade the prosecutor to negotiate
directly with the incarcerated activists as a group. In the end, the prosecutor
obliged and went to the jail, spending two hours with the men followed by
two hours with the women. The prosecutor eventually accepted the deal the
activists insisted on-reducing the misdemeanours to infractions and
suspending any fines in consideration of the time spent in jail. As in
Washington, D.C., the deal applied to those already released as well as to
those still in jail negotiating the agreement. In addition to agreeing to their
demands, the prosecutor also made repeated public statements
acknowledging the integrity and commitment of the demonstrators.
Solidarity tactics were remarkably successful in achieving dismissal
of the criminal charges. In both D.C. and L.A., a small percentage of the
activists remaining in jail were able to pressure the system to reduce
charges to infractions. In addition, the solidarity tactics achieved minor
victories for the protestors along the way: keeping individual prisoners from
being separated or getting them returned to the group if they had been
separated; persuading the jail officials to allow them to hold mass meetings
and councils of representatives from the various groups of detainees; and
allowing their lawyers and legal assistants to meet with the prisoners en
masse.
In each of the three demonstrations, some fifteeen to thirty people
were also charged with felonies. Although the demonstrators also tried to
get these charges reduced, they were unsuccessful. Thus, there are at least
two different stories that could be told about the demonstrations and the
police response.
One story would emphasize the police success at keeping the
demonstrations no larger than they have been and at dominating the media
with talk of violent anarchist groups. Anyone who acts in a disruptive
manner is successfully prosecuted for a felony, while the people jailed and
released generally should never have been arrested in the first place. In this
story, those engaged in civil disobedience are marginalized and, by their
getting out of jail, most of the public will not consider them to be engaged
in civil disobedience-the popular mind still requires one to go quietly or
happily to jail to dramatize one's disagreement with an unjust law. The
demonstrators' time and energy are dissipated taking care of themselves
instead of protecting the environment, improving wages and working
conditions, or replacing free trade, run by and for the corporations, with
fair trade, conducted by and for the people of the world.
A second story is very different. It emphasizes the growing public
awareness of the issues involved in the world financial system and world
trade. In this story the World Bank and the WTO are under greater public
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scrutiny than ever before. Perhaps most important of all, alliances are being
built between trade unionists, environmentalists, feminists, and other
activists throughout the world.
The solidarity tactics I have described in this commentary play an
important role in building the movement and demonstrating the power of
the people. Police repression simply will not work-at least not until they
devise some counter-strategy to get around the current legal strategies used
by the demonstrators. These solidarity tactics can be and are being adapted
to work in other countries throughout the world. The World Bank, wro,
and other corporate financial organizations can no longer hold quiet
meetings behind closed doors--demonstrations are taking place
everywhere. The trade union movement in the United States, moribund as
it has been, shows important signs of coming back to life. Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are springing up everywhere and
beginning to work together in evolving alliances.
There is a world economy supported by a world financial network
that suffers from what the European Union calls a "democratic deficit."
This democratic deficit is now on the table and being struggled with
throughout the world. It is still too early to be sure which of these two
stories will prevail or whether a third story will emerge. One thing is clear:
solidarity tactics have significantly altered legal responses to mass protest
actions.
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